This Day In Gay Utah History October 13

October 13th

1896-The play "A Florida Enchantment" was reviewed in the New York Times. Some of the characters swallowed a magic seed which transformed them into members of the opposite sex. It was described as vile, stupid, and the worst play ever produced in New York. In 1914 "A Florida Enchantment" was made into  a silent film.  The film version is based on the 1891 novel and 1896 play (now lost) of the same name written by Fergus Redmond and Archibald Clavering Gunter. The film has also been considered to have the first documented appearance of bisexual characters in an American motion picture and as one of the earliest film representations of homosexuality and cross-dressing in American culture.

1913-John Oscor at the county of Salt Lake City, State of Utah, on the 13th day of October A.D. 1913, did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit the infamous crime against nature by then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously having carnal knowledge of the body of  Mike Lasko the said Mike Lasko being then and there a male person. Contrary to the provisions of the statute of the State aforesaid, in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Utah.” 

• John Oscar Case No. 3386 Third District Judicial Court  having heretofore been duly committed to this court by Harry S. Harper, a Committing Magistrate of said County, to answer to this charge, is accused by E.O. Leatherwood, District Attorney of the Third Judicial District of the State of Utah, Salt Lake County, by this information, of the CRIME AGAINST NATURE committed as follows, to-wit:  That the said John Oscar was charged with Infamous Crime Against nature for having sexual relations with Mike Lasko in 1913. Mike Lasko filed a complaint 14 October 1913 against John Oscor for having sex with him. He was tried in the Third District Court and on January 5, 1914 Oscar pled not guilty but later on January 16 he pled guilty. He was sentenced to State prison 17 January 1914 to serve a sentence of three years. John Oscar is not listed in the 1900 nor 1910 Census therefore not a long time resident.  
• No Lasko is listed in the 1910 Census but a Gust. Laskos employed as a cook roomed at 553 West 200 South who may be one and the same
• Transcript: October 14, 1913 Filed affidavit of Mike Lasko charging defendant with infamous crime against nature. October 14, 1913 Warrant of arrest issued to Chief of Police-October 14, 1913 Warrant filed on return
• October 14, 1913 Defendant appeared and entered plea of not guilty. Bail fixed at $1000
• October 14, 1913 Commitment issued Trial set for October 18^th, 1913 at 10:00 A.M. On motion of Horace H. Smith, assistant County attorney witness Mike Lasko placed under bond in the sum of $250 to appear as a witness in the above case. Commitment issued for Mike Lasko
• October 18, 1913 Case tried before court, Horace H. Smith, assistant County attorney, appearing for the state and the defendant in person. John S. Rollo sworn a stenographer October 18, 1913 The following witnesses were sworn and examined for the state: Mike Lasko and Dr. Hardie Lynch The following witnesses were sworn and examined for the defense: John Oscor. The Court finds evidence that the offense charged in the complaint has been committed and probable cause to believe defendant guilty thereof. Wherefore it is ordered and adjudged that the defendant be held to answer to the Third District Court under bond in the sum of$1000.00  Witness Mike Lasko released from custody.
• 5 January 1914 Pled Not Guilty
• 16 January 1914 Pled Guilty State of Utah Plaintiff VS John Oscor Defendant Be it remembered that on this 16^th day of January A.D. the above entitled cause case on regularly hearing before Honorable Morris L. Ritchie, one of the Judges of said court, the defendant being personally in court, the state being represented by E.O. Leatherwood Esq., District Attorney of the Third District, the following proceedings were had: MR. MORGAN: I was given to understand by the defendant that he is willing to plead guilty to the first charge. THE DEFENDANT: He misunderstood me when he was over there. I plead not guilty to either one of those charges because I an innocent of both of the charges put against me. THE COURT: You are ready to go to trial then? You wish to stand on your plea of not guilty? THE DEFENDANT: Yes sir. THE COURT: Which case do you wish to try first? MR. FARNSWORTH: The first case on the calendar MR. MORGAN: The defendant is ready to plead guilty of the charge of sodomy. He understands the District Attorney will drop the charge of robbery. I understand the District Attorney will make the recommendation. THE COURT: The Court hasn’t anything to do with understandings. The Court will hear recommendations and act upon them. If the defendant wishes to change his plea in this case I will hear what he has to say. MR. MORGAN: That is what we understand; he changes his plea of not guilty to guilty of the offense charged. THE COURT: You have heretofore been charged by the information of the District Attorney with the crime described by the statute as the infamous crime against nature, alleged to have been committed with one Mike Lasko a male person, in the county of Salt Lake and State of Utah on the 13^th day of October 1913, Upon this information you have been arraigned and heretofore you have pleaded not guilty. Do you desire to change your plea at this time? THE DEFENDANT: The way I understood, for mercy I would plead guilty. And about that money, I want to get that money back too; got $2.00 of my money. THE COURT: Of course the court does not jknow about other matters. They only thing the court can deal with now is to deal with this offense. The court wants you to understand fully what the consequences of the plea of guilty may be. The highest term of imprisonment that the law fixes for that offense is twenty years and the lowest is three years. The least the court could give you is three years in the state prison. You know what the facts are and you know whether you want to stand trial or enter a plea of guilty. If you enter a plea of guilty it would be possible for the court to make the sentence as low as three years. That depends of course somewhat upon the circumstances what it ought to be, but the court could do no better than that: the law does not permit me to do anything else then sentence you----does not permit me to sentence you to any less term than a term of three years. Do you think you understand your own mind as to what you want to do? THE DEFENDANT: I plead guilty THE COURT: You are willing, then to withdraw your plea of not guilty and to enter a plea of guilty? THE DEFENDANT: Yes THE COURT: You are entitled under law to two days additional time before the court shall sentence you. DO you wish to take that time? That is, if you wish the court would have to wait until Monday morning before pronouncing sentence. Do you want to take that time, or are you willing to waive the time and let the court pronounce sentence now? THE DEFENDANT: I am ready. You can pronounce sentence now, your Honor. THE COURT: The mind of the court is, for reasons not necessary to state now, not to pronounce any greater judgment than the minimum penalty, unless the District Attorney has some reason to urge to the contrary. MR. FARNSWORTH: From the circumstances of the case, particularly the facts surrounding complaining witness in the case, that meets the view of the District Attorney’s office. THE COURT: The complaining witness an adult himself? MR FARNSWORTH: Yes, he is an adult, and he paid this man for committing the act too; that is, that appears from the testimony, and I am inclined to believe that is the fact. THE COURT: John Oscar, you have heretofore been charged by the information of the District Attorney with the crime decribed in the statute as the infamous crime against nature, alleged to have been committed on the 13^th day of October 1913, in Salt Lake County, in the State of Utah, by then and there unlawfully, feloniously, and willfully having carnal knowledge of the body of one Mike Lasko, he being a male person, contrary to provisions in such case made and provided. To this information you have pleaded that you are guilty and you have waived time for the pronouncing of dentence. Have you any reason to urge now why the court should not pronounce sentenceupon this charge and upon your plea hereto? Have you anything to say? THE DEFENDANT: I don’t understand it. THE COURT: What is your native tongue? Do you speak English? THE DEFENDANT: Austrian. I was born on Austria, Croatia THE COURT: How long have you lived in this country? THE DEFENDANT: I have been here twelve years THE COURT: You speak English fairly well? THE DEFENDANT: Yes sir. I speak only outside with people pretty well. There is a whole lot of words I don’t understand. THE COURT: Let me see if I can make it clearer then. You are charged with this act; you know what that is? THE DEFENDANT: Yes THE COURT: Committed with this man Lasca; that you did certain things to him; you know what that means? THE DEFENDANT: Yes THE COURT: Committed an act such as might be committed with a woman, with a man? THE DEFENDANT: I understand THE COURT: You understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes THE COURT: That is against the law. You understand that too, do you? THE DEFENDANT: yes THE COURT: Now then, you have pleaded guilty you say? THE DEFENDANT: Yes Sir THE COURT: You did it? THE DEFENDANT: Yes Sir THE COURT: All the court is asking you now is whether you have anything else to say before the court pronounces sentence upon you. I have already explained to that I have to make it at least three years, and I have no hesitation in saying that I see no reason why it should be greater than that. THE DEFENDANT: The only thing I have got to say, just the same as I said before in Harper’s Court, the way it happened he told me to come on and do this, but either one of us didn’t do anything of this act as you said I am in here for, as I am charged with. That is all I got to say. THE COURT: I am afraid the defendant doesn’t understand the situation. Have you talked to him through an interpreter Mr. Morgan. MR MORGAN: No THE COURT: Has the District Attorney’s office ever talked to him through an interpreter? MR. FARNSWORTH: We have a transcript of his statement down below to the effect--- MR. LEATHERWOOD: He had talked to me; he understands. THE COURT: Was there an interpreter in the court below? MR. FARNSWORTH: No, I don’t think so. THE DEFENDANT: You needn’t bother with no interpreter. I plead guilty and let it go at that. THE COURT: Why do you say, then you didn’t do it? The Court doesn’t want to punish men for offenses they do not commit, but the court doesn’t want to be trifled with either. Does the transcript show that the defendant was represented by an attorney at the preliminary hearing? MR. FARNSWORTH: No he was not. THE COURT: These questions were propounded by the defendant himself? MR. FARNSWORTH: Yes THE COURT: The court has heretofore stated to you what the nature of the charge is. You have pleaded guilty. Have you anything further to say why the court should not pass sentence? THE DEFENDANT: That is all THE COURT: The judgment of the court is that you be taken by the Sheriff of this county to the state prison and there be confined for a term of three years. MR FARNSWORTH: In the case of the State of Utah vs John Oscar in which the charge is robbery, case 3385, we ask that the case be dismissed, and any exhibits that there may be, the property of the defendant, be returned to him. THE COURT: That may be the order.
• 17 January 1914 The Third District Court sentenced Oscor for the infamous crime against nature to three years in Prison which was the minimum proscribed by Utah State law.
• 6 February 1914 To the Honorable Board of Pardons of the State of Utah Gentleman In accordance with the provision of Chapter 100 of the Session Lkaws if the State of Utah of 1913. I hereby transmit in duplicate the statement required by that Act.  In my opinion the defendant ought not to serve a longer term than one year for this offense. It is true the statute makes three years the minimum. The sentence necessarily could not be less than the minimum. While the crime is a brutal and disgusting one in the extreme, it was not a case of a man abusing or seducing a boy, or one which disclosed any condition where one having an influence over another abused it, but apparently simply a case where two lusty human animals of brutal instincts gratified them. The only person harmed were the two men themselves. Apparently there was no one else offected to be scandalized or injured by their example. It is easy to imagine crimes of this nature where the extreme penalty of the law, twenty years might seem inadequate, but I doubt very much whether severe penaliies have any particular effect on two individuals of this kind who indulge their brutish instincts by meeting on a level of equality. There is nothing else against the defendant, and if the Board by applying the provisions of the indetermined sentence act, or by exercise of the power of parole, should release him after one year, I can see no reason to object to that, providing his conduct in the meantime warrants it. Respectfully S.M. Ritchie Judge
• 19 February 1914 Salt Lake City; Mr. Andrew Smith Jr. Dear Sir, At the time of my arrest there was in my possession four dollars ($4.00) which was taken from me, and held as evidence, and I would like you to look this matter up and send me the money. I was told by the court that I could have the money, so please let me hear from you at your earliest convenience. Your Respt. John Oscar. Address Utah State Prison
• 14 October 1914; John Oscor wrote to the Utah State Board of Pardons for a commutation of his three year sentence.
• 21 November 1914; The Warden wrote to the Utah State Board of Pardons starting that Oscor was in first grade standing.
• 18 December 1915 The Warden wrote to the Utah State Board of Pardons starting that Oscor was in first grade standing.
• 25 April 1915: John Oscor wrote to the Utah State Board of Pardons for a commutation of his three year sentence stating that he had served 27 months and was still with the State Road Camp.

J Bracken Lee

1967 Salt Lake City police activity in attempting to control prostitution was described, Thursday, by Public Safety Commissioner James L. Barker Jr. as just “trying to protect the safety of the community not trying to enforce any moral code. “The suggestion by Mayor J Bracken Lee that the answer to ending vice crimes was to legalize prostitution “would in reality be nothing more than an open invitation for organized crime to come into the city,” Barker said.  Pointing to the fact there were 16 arrests in SLC for prostitution in 1964 and 15 arrests in 1965.  Mr. Barker who became commissioner 1 January 1966 said 40 arrests for prostitution and solicitations for sexual acts for hire so far this year.  Mayor J. Bracken Lee denied that he said prostitutes be licensed and inspected..” Mr. Barker is head of the department.  He should do more enforcing and less talking about prostitution.” (10/13/67 SLTribune page B2)

Jean Sinclair

1971  Jean Sinclair appeals her murder conviction. Nursing home operator, Jean Sinclair, at the age forty-five,  was arrested in 1963 and charged with first degree murder for the ambush killing of thirty-one-year-old Don LeRoy Foster of Salt Lake City. He was killed by a shotgun blast in the parking lot at the Susan Kay Arms Apartments, 650 North 200 West. LaRae Peterson, age thirty-two, who was in Foster’s car at the time, was the object of Sinclair’s affection but had recently engaged Foster. The prosecutor claimed Sinclair became jealous and after unsuccessfully attempting to hire an ex-con to do the killing she did it herself. The all-male jury found her guilty but recommended leniency. She was sentenced to life in prison and served until 15 May 1973, when she was paroled to a nursing home where she died 3 July 1973.

• Jean SINCLAIR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John W. TURNER, Warden, Utah State Prison, Defendant-Appellee. United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit October 13, 1971 447 F.2d 1158 James M. Gansinger, Denver, Colo., for plaintiff-appellant. David S. Young, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, Utah (Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., and Lauren N. Beasley, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., on the brief), for defendant-appellee. Before BREITENSTEIN, McWILLIAMS and BARRETT, Circuit Judges. BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Jean Sinclair was convicted following a sixteen-day State jury trial in the District Court of Salt Lake City, Utah, of the crime of first degree murder of one Don LeRoy Foster. Following a jury recommendation for leniency the Court sentenced Sinclair to life imprisonment. Her conviction was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court. State v. Sinclair, 15 Utah 2d 162, 389 P.2d 465 (1964). In June, 1966, Sinclair filed a habeas corpus application with the same trial court. An evidentiary hearing was held and the application denied. She appealed that denial to the Utah Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower court. Sinclair v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 126, 434 P.2d 305 (1967). The parties here agree that when Sinclair filed her application with the Federal District Court below she had exhausted her available state remedies. 
• (2) Sinclair appeals here from the order of the United States District Court denying her application for writ of habeas corpus. At pre-trial it was stipulated that one of the petitioner's claims for determination was that "under the totality of circumstances" Sinclair was deprived of her right to a fair trial secured by the 6th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. The court below took judicial notice of all State Court records and proceedings. An evidentiary hearing was not held. The Court denied relief finding "that under all of the facts and circumstances surrounding her trial that the petitioner was not deprived of the right to a fair trial as secured by the 6th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, or at all * * *". In light of that finding this court will consider each of the appellant's contentions as if they had been specifically argued and rejected by the court below. The court determined that Sinclair had received a full and fair evidentiary hearing in the Utah State Courts, both at the time of original trial and in collateral post-conviction and habeas proceedings. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S. Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963). The Court found, by independent examination, that the State Court proceedings were presumptively correct, citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The writ was denied August 23, 1970. This appeal is from that order. 
• (3) The United States Supreme Court in Townsend v. Sain, supra, held that the Federal District Court has the power to receive evidence and try the facts anew on a habeas corpus petition and must do so "where the facts are in dispute * * * if the habeas applicant did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in the State Court, either at the time of trial or in a collateral proceeding," and that the court is not limited to a study of the undisputed portions of the State court records. 
• (4) In lieu of application of the appellate review rule holding that the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the government in order to determine if the evidence, direct and circumstantial, coupled with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, is substantial in justification of the jury verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, [Lewis v. United States, 420 F.2d 1089 (10th Cir. 1970); Mares v. United States, 409 F.2d 1083 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied 394 U.S. 963, 89 S.Ct. 1314, 22 L.Ed.2d 564 (1969)], we proceed in accordance with the pertinent provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d).[1] 
• (5) Federal habeas corpus does not serve as an additional appeal from State court conviction. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963). Sufficiency of evidence to support a State conviction raises no Federal constitutional question, and cannot be considered in Federal habeas proceedings by State prisoners. Linebarger v. State of Oklahoma, 404 F.2d 1092 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied 394 U.S. 938, 89 S.Ct. 1218, 22 L.Ed.2d 470 (1969); Williams v. Wainwright, 414 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1969). The guilt or innocence of an accused person when determined by a State court is not subject to review by Federal courts in habeas corpus proceedings. A State prisoner is entitled to relief in Federal courts only when rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution have been denied him. Opie v. Meacham, 419 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 399 U.S. 927, 90 S.Ct. 2239, 26 L.Ed.2d 793 (1970); Wagenknecht v. Crouse, 344 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1965). 
• (6) We have reviewed all of the records, including the original State trial record. Any reference herein to those records is, under the rules above referred to, limited to contentions presented by appellant Sinclair alleging that her rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States have been denied. Mathis v. People of State of Colorado, 425 F.2d 1165 (10th Cir. 1970). 
• (7) Sinclair contends that the lower court erred in its ruling that she had not been denied her rights guaranteed by the 6th and 14th Amendments and the due process clause of the Constitution of the United States by reason of the State trial court's limitation on cross-examination of the State's principal witness, Carl Kuehne, thus preventing Sinclair from attacking Kuehne's credibility in violation of an accused's right to confrontation of witnesses against her. 
• (8) The prosecutor, soon after calling Kuehne as a State witness, fully developed that Kuehne had been convicted and confined in the Utah State Penitentiary following a 1952 felony charge of assault with a deadly weapon; that Kuehne had escaped from the penitentiary, gave himself up and was returned to the penitentiary; that he was released in December of 1959. Kuehne had been attending the University of Utah since his release, and at the time of trial in February of 1963 was a senior majoring in mathematics. The State made no attempt to conceal Kuehne's felony record or otherwise deprive the jury of knowledge concerning his felony conviction. It presented his record so that, in effect, his credibility was at issue at the outset. United States v. Perea, 413 F. 2d 65 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 945, 90 S.Ct. 960, 25 L.Ed.2d 125 (1970). 
• (9) Sinclair contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error in curtailing cross-examination of Kuehne with respect to his felony conviction. On cross-examination Kuehne was asked what he had been convicted of. When he responded that he had been convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, he was asked, "What was the weapon?" The objection lodged to this question by the prosecutor was sustained. Sinclair cites a number of decisions holding that the right of a defendant to engage in extensive cross-examination is an essential requirement for a fair trial. None of these decisions, however, relate specifically to the scope and extent of cross-examination with reference to prior convictions. In effect, Sinclair contends that the Court erred in not permitting cross-examination of Kuehne with respect to the details of the felony of which he had been convicted. The Utah Supreme Court ruled on this issue in State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P.2d 407 (1963). There the Court opined on the right of a prosecutor to question the accused regarding prior felony convictions in relationship to his credibility as a witness. The Court held that when an accused voluntarily takes the witness stand he may be asked whether or not he has been convicted of a felony, and, if he responds in the affirmative, he may be asked only the nature of the felony. The Court ruled that details or circumstances surrounding the felony which the accused was convicted of may not be inquired into except under unusual circumstances, i. e., where the inquiry would tend to show a scheme, plan, modus operandi, or the like. In the case at bar when the prosecutor's objection to the question "What was the weapon?" was sustained by the Court, Sinclair's attorney did not make a specific offer of proof. Accordingly, there is nothing in the record indicating that Kuehne's answer would have met the "unusual circumstances" exceptions referred to in State v. Kazda, supra. This court has held that when a witness's credibility has been impeached by his admission of prior felony convictions, it is within the trial court's discretion to refuse to permit further inquiry or to develop extrinsic evidence relative thereto. Butler v. United States, 408 F.2d 1103 (10th Cir. 1969); United States v. Perea, supra; Foster v. United States, 282 F.2d 222 (10th Cir. 1960). 
• (10) Sinclair claims error on the part of the trial court in not permitting certain interrogation of Kuehne on cross-examination relating to his alleged psychiatric record. Defense counsel asked Kuehne whether he had ever gone to psychiatrists for evaluation and treatment. He stated that he had undergone psychiatric evaluation and treatment while in prison as a matter of "standard procedure". He also acknowledged visiting with a psychiatrist who lived next door to his family's home in New Jersey, but he denied that this relationship was one of "doctor-patient". Counsel then asked Kuehne whether or not he had been discharged from the army with a "psycho discharge". Kuehne responded negatively. The prosecutor objected on the grounds that the interrogation was without proper foundation. The Court sustained the objection. Thereafter defense counsel submitted an offer of proof indicating that through further cross-examination, with specific reference to certain psychiatrists, dating back to 1948, 1951 and 1959, it would be established that Kuehne was a "psychopathic personality with schizophrenic tendencies and impulse to act out immediately at any time when his ego is involved". The State objected on the grounds that such proof was too remote and had nothing to do with Kuehne's present abilities or condition. Kuehne had already testified that the only time that he had gone to a psychiatrist for evaluation was during his stay in prison, which was a matter of "standard procedure". During the offer of proof, Sinclair made no claim that she could or would produce any hospital, medical or prison records, or that she could or would produce any examining physicians to impeach Kuehne's testimony. 
• (11)The capacity of a person offered as a witness is presumed, and in order to exclude a witness on the ground of mental or moral incapacity, the existence of the incapacity must be made to appear. Vol. II, Wigmore on Evidence, § 497, 3rd Ed. (1940). The fact of insanity or mental abnormality either at the time of observing the facts which he reports in his testimony, or at the time of testifying, may be provable, on cross-examination or by extrinsic evidence, as bearing on credibility. Foster v. United States, supra; Vol. IIIA, Wigmore on Evidence, §§ 931-936 (1940). 
• (12 ) Appellant, in this argument, consistently referred to Kuehne as an accomplice. The Trial Court properly instructed the jury on this question. The issue was then one of fact for jury consideration. But even should we assume that Kuehne was an accomplice, that fact alone would not mean that he was an incompetent witness or that he could not tell the truth. It simply means that his testimony was to be weighed with great care and received with caution. Butler v. United States, supra. Sinclair has pointed out, by specific references to the record, that the trial court did not restrain her in presenting oral testimony to the effect that Kuehne's reputation in the community was that of a "compulsive liar". 
• (13) The scope and extent of cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 88 S.Ct. 748, 19 L.Ed. 2d 956 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the cross-examination of Kuehne and that, in no event would the court's rulings constitute plain or fundamental error within the purview of Rule 52(b), Fed.R.Crim.P. Such error has been described by this court as "serious prejudicial error" in the conduct of the trial affecting life or liberty. Whaley v. United States, 394 F.2d 399 (10th Cir. 1968). In determining whether the "plain error" rule should be invoked the appellate court must consider the whole record. Adams v. United States, 375 F.2d 635 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied 389 U.S. 880, 88 S.Ct. 117, 19 L.Ed.2d 173 (1967). II. 
• (14) Sinclair contends that she was deprived of due process of law and of her constitutional right against self-incrimination by actions of the trial court and the prosecution relating to questions propounded by the prosecutor to her and LaRae Peterson concerning homosexual acts between them, when the prosecutor knew that they would claim the privilege against self-incrimination. It is further contended that the trial court failed to admonish the jury that no inference may be drawn from the claim of the privilege against self-incrimination, and that the failure to so admonish denied Sinclair her constitutional right against self-incrimination guaranteed by the 5th and 14th Amendments. It is also argued that this error was compounded in its prejudicial effect by statements of the prosecutor in summation. 
• (15 ) Sinclair contends that the prosecutor had actual knowledge of the fact that she and LaRae Peterson would claim the privilege against self-incrimination with regard to questions directed to any alleged homosexual relations between them. In support of this contention Sinclair makes reference to her own brief filed on appeal with the Utah Supreme Court. This, of course, is self-serving. A review of the entire record of the State trial proceedings does not indicate that the prosecuting attorney had any fore-knowledge that Sinclair or Peterson would claim the privilege. 
• (16) The State's witnesses, Carl Kuehne, Vaughn Humphries and LaRae Kuehne, each testified to matters indicating a homosexual relationship between Sinclair and LaRae Peterson. Carl Kuehne testified with respect to a conversation which he claimed to have had with Sinclair in which she spoke of killing Don Foster. Kuehne said that he told Sinclair that Vaughn Humphries had remarked that she was a lesbian. The record is replete with references of Sinclair's desire to break up the relationship between LaRae Peterson and the decedent, Don Foster. Both Carl Kuehne and Vaughn Humphries testified that Sinclair suggested that they form a "Danites" committee and proceed to either threaten or actually castrate Foster. Kuehne and his wife, LaRae, testified that Sinclair had informed them that since she had the name of "lesbian" that they should aid her in enticing LaRae Peterson to come to her rest home, at which time she would drug and strip her and "put on a lesbian act", arranging for Foster to witness it. Humphries testified that the lesbian relationship between Sinclair and Peterson was related to him by Thayle Olson who was employed at Sinclair's rest home. The record establishes that Sinclair often dressed in men's clothing and that she combed her hair straight back similar to that of a man. Her attachment for and affinity toward LaRae Peterson and her deep concern with respect to the relationship between Peterson and the decedent, Don Foster, was firmly established. 
• (17) LaRae Peterson was called as a prosecution witness. She acknowledged that she had "visited" with Jean Sinclair at Covey's Motel in Salt Lake City on more than one occasion. The prosecutor asked her if she and Jean Sinclair had ever committed any lesbian acts with each other. She invoked the 5th Amendment on the grounds that the answer would tend to incriminate and degrade her. The Court ordered her to respond to the question. She refused to do so. Thereafter she testified that she had received a note from Jean Sinclair and in her handwriting, some time during the month of April, 1962, after she had been going with Don Foster, reading as follows: 
• (18 ) "Dearest One: 
• (19) I love you with all of me. I didn't mean it for a minute (sorry that I ever met you). You know that I didn't live until you loved me. I love, want and need you and your love. Whatever I must do I will do. Please be patient and help me, honey. Your love is all that has kept me going. I promise never to mention the men in your life again. All I want is to have you and Cheryl Ann happy. Please let me. 
• (20) All my love always.  2:45 a. m." 
• (21) The letter was admitted in evidence. Ellen McHenry, a partner of Jean Sinclair in the operation of the rest home in Salt Lake City, testified that she hired a private detective to get something on LaRae Peterson and Don Foster, purportedly for the purpose of protecting LaRae's child, Cheryl Ann. She stated that Sinclair knew nothing about the hiring or activities of the private detective. Sinclair's name was brought to the attention of the police in regard to the Foster murder by LaRae Peterson on the afternoon following the shooting. 
• (22) Jean Sinclair testified in her own behalf. She stated that with respect to the relationship between LaRae Peterson and the decedent, Don Foster, she was simply concerned about Peterson's minor child, Cheryl Ann, who was cared for at the rest home during the long period of time in which LaRae Peterson was "running around" with about 15 different men, including Foster. She believed that the child's affection had turned toward her and Ellen McHenry, in lieu of the normal affection between mother and child. She related that Vaughn Humphries was telling "stories" that she was a "lesbian". She said that she phoned Humphries and told him that if he did not stop making remarks that she was a lesbian, that she would file suit against him. She further testified on direct examination that she had never discussed lesbianism with Carl Kuehne or with any other person. Sinclair opened the door with respect to the subject matter of lesbianism and homosexuality by reason of her own direct testimony. On cross-examination Sinclair stated that the note, in her handwriting and directed to LaRae Peterson, constituted nothing more than the same "feeling" which she had for Ellen McHenry and her children. On further cross she invoked the 5th Amendment in relation to certain questions concerning the note. She did, however, upon the advice of counsel, respond to specific portions of the note. When asked what she meant by "Dearest One" she refused to answer. When asked what she meant by "I love you with all of me" she refused to answer. When asked what she meant by "You know that I didn't live until you loved me" she refused to answer. When asked what she meant by "Your love is all that has kept me going" she refused to answer. Again, during cross-examination the following colloquy took place: 
• (23) "Q. Have you been in love with LaRae Peterson? 
• (24) A. What do you mean by that? Q. Are you a lesbian? 
• (25) A. Again, will you explain it? 
• (26) Q. I will ask you if you ever committed any homosexual acts on LaRae or she with you? 
• (27) A. I refuse to answer this question on the ground that it may tend to incriminate me or degrade me." 
• (28) During summation the prosecutor made very little comment on the relationship between Sinclair and Peterson. The prosecutor commented simply as follows: 
• (29) "Now, the question of homosexuality. It has nothing to do with this case and the Court has instructed you only insofar as it might refer to a motive. We are not trying Jean Sinclair for any relationship between LaRae Peterson and herself. But it does come into the case, unfortunately, because it provides a motive." 
• (30) The Court made it abundantly clear to the jury that neither Sinclair nor LaRae Peterson were on trial for homosexual relations and that any such relations were not connected to the homicide except insofar as they relate to a motive which Sinclair might have had in relationship to the murder of Peterson's boyfriend, Don Foster. 
• (31) On this appeal Sinclair contends that the State of Utah knew that she would claim the privilege against self-incrimination with regard to any questions relating to homosexuality and nevertheless the State advanced those questions. There is nothing in this record beyond the appellant's own brief filed with the Utah Supreme Court which substantiates this contention. Sinclair has at no time or in anywise before this court acknowledged that she raised the issue. When she testified with respect to the rumors which she attributed to Vaughn Humphries that she was a lesbian, she stated that she contacted Humphries and threatened to file suit against him if he continued to spread the rumors. This testimony was, in effect, a denial of any homosexual relationship with LaRae Peterson. On direct testimony she also denied that she had ever discussed lesbianism with Carl Kuehne, but she said that Kuehne had informed her that Humphries was circulating stories that she was a lesbian. When asked about her conversation with Humphries she testified: 
• (32) "I told him what I had been told and that Ellen was very unhappy about it as well as I was. I reminded him that he had had problems before and that it wouldn't help him any to have a suit and that we were going to instigate a suit against him if he didn't stop and stop now." (33) It is well established that the case of an accused who voluntarily takes the stand, and the case of an accused who refrains from testifying, are vastly different. Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 63 S.Ct. 549, 87 L.Ed. 704 (1943). When an accused voluntarily offers testimony upon any fact he waives the privilege against self-incrimination as to that fact and all other relevant facts because of the necessary connection between all. Johnson v. United States, supra; Vol. VIII, Wigmore on Evidence, § 2276(2), 3rd Ed., 1940. The rule applies here. An accused may be cross-examined as to subjects already dealt with in his direct examination. In Johnson v. United States, supra, at 201, 63 S.Ct. at 555, the Court observed:
• (34) "We cannot permit an accused to elect to pursue one course at the trial and then, when that has proved to be unprofitable, to insist on appeal that the course which he rejected at the trial be re-opened to him. However unwise the first choice may have been, the range of waiver is wide. Since the protection which could have been obtained was plainly waived, the accused cannot now be heard to charge the court with depriving him of fair trial. The court only followed the course which he himself helped to chart and in which he acquiesced until the case was argued on appeal." 
• (35) It seems strange that Sinclair would contend that the prosecutor was put on notice, in advance of trial, that she would claim the privilege against self-incrimination, and then expect this court to grant her the best of two worlds. If a defendant in a criminal case voluntarily takes the stand and testifies in his own defense, his credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness, and the breadth of his waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination. He has no right to set forth to the jury all of the facts which tend in his favor without laying himself open to a cross-examination on those facts. Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 20 S.Ct. 944, 44 L.Ed. 1078 (1900); Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301, 15 S.Ct. 610, 39 L.Ed. 709 (1895). 
• (36) In light of the waiver effected by Sinclair relating to the privilege against self-incrimination, she has no standing here to raise the challenge of the privilege applicable to LaRae Peterson. The testimony sought by the prosecution from Sinclair and LaRae Peterson was proper in support of the Government's case going to the vital element of motive involved in the murder of Don Foster. United States v. Eagleston, 417 F.2d 11 (10th Cir. 1969); Moran v. United States, 404 F.2d 663 (10th Cir. 1968). When LaRae Peterson was asked by the prosecutor about any homosexual relationship with Sinclair, she invoked the privilege against self-incrimination. The trial court directed her to answer. She refused to do so. The State was entitled to call LaRae Peterson to testify to non-privileged matters necessary to corroborate the Government's case. The existence of an unnatural relationship between Sinclair and Peterson, together with reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, was critical to prove motive. Crimes and transactions not otherwise involved in the principal charge, while otherwise inadmissible, are properly admitted if they tend to establish an element of the principal offense charged. Mills v. United States, 367 F.2d 366 (10th Cir. 1966); Weeks v. United States, 313 F.2d 688 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied 373 U.S. 922, 83 S.Ct. 1523, 10 L.Ed.2d 421 (1963). It does no violence to the privilege that a person's choice to testify in his own behalf may open the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence which is damaging to his case. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967); Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 69 S.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948). 
• (37) In view of Sinclair's waiver we find no merit in her contentions here. III. 
• (38) Sinclair contends that the elimination of persons conscientiously opposed to the death penalty from the jury denied her due process of law and her right to a fair trial. 
• (39) Sinclair was charged and tried for first degree murder. Utah Code Annotated 1953, § 76-30-4, prescribes the death penalty unless the jury recommends life imprisonment and the Court concurs. Sinclair argues that the de jure exclusion from jury service at her trial of members of the Salt Lake County community who were opposed to the death penalty for moral or religious reasons prevented her from receiving a fair trial, thus constituting a denial of due process of law and equal protection thereof. 
• (40) In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), the United States Supreme Court held that it is constitutionally impermissible to exclude from jury service those prospective jurors who express conscientious scruples concerning imposition of capital punishment, without inquiring whether under any circumstances the person could impose the death penalty. The Court stated that a man who opposed the death penalty, no less than one who favors it, can make the discretionary judgment entrusted to him and can obey the oath he takes as a juror. Sinclair contends that the Supreme Court "sidestepped" the true and central issue. She argues that this court should focus on the system which permits selection of members of the jury in such a way as to exclude a "significant segment of the community"; that the use of the "death qualified" qualification in the calculus of the trial is inherently unconstitutional, not because the State has produced "a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die", but rather because such a jury is not representative of the community and is not, accordingly, a jury of one's peers. We observe that the United States Supreme Court in Witherspoon, supra, did not "sidestep" the issue as Sinclair claims. The Court specially found that there is insufficient data to establish that jurors not opposed to the death penalty tend to favor the prosecution. Appellant offers no data here.
•  (41) Sinclair recognizes that Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968), controls here and renders her contentions unmeritorious unless this court adopts the same constitutional rule which the Supreme Court rejected in Witherspoon, supra. We decline to do so and respectfully suggest that the issue is one more properly for legislative consideration. In Bumper, supra, the Court refused to reverse a conviction on a rape charge involving possible capital punishment. The jury recommended life imprisonment and the sentence was so entered. The Court held that its Witherspoon decision did not apply because the jury recommended life imprisonment. The same reasoning applies here. 
• (42 ) The very purpose of the criminal justice system is that of investigating, charging, trying, convicting and sentencing those who have committed offenses legislatively determined to be violative of the rights of persons and property. Legislators represent a cross-section of the community.  IV. 
• 43 ) Sinclair argues that certain matters contained in the State's brief filed with the Utah Supreme Court are "purposeful misstatements of fact" relied upon by that Court relating to testimony of police officer LaMar B. Williams and one Boyd K. Harvey. A review of the trial record convinces us that her contentions are without substance. 
• (44) Sinclair contends that she was denied a fair trial by reason of the trial court's failure to properly admonish the jury and to insulate the jury from "adverse" publicity generated by the trial. The jury was not sequestered. The record does not reflect any request or motion by the defense to sequester. Sinclair recognizes that this is a matter discretionary with the court. She complains of the "prejudicial" publicity of the trial and the "carnival atmosphere" in the courtroom. These matters have been fully litigated in the Utah State courts and reviewed here. We find no merit in these contentions. Where there has been a full and fair evidentiary hearing in the State courts, there is no basis for an evidentiary hearing in the Federal courts on the same issues. Cindle v. Page, 424 F.2d 509 (10th Cir. 1970). 
• (45) Sinclair argues that the Trial Court's failure to sequester was compounded in error in that "the record demonstrates that the only time that the Trial Court admonished the jury to avoid contact with publicity was at the time when the jury was selected on April 15, 1963." The record is replete with the official reporter's notes entered prior to each recess and continuance that the Court "admonished" the jury. And near the end of trial defense counsel volunteered to the Court: "I agree and stipulate that the admonition to the jury at each recess or each continuance has been proper." R. 1549. 
• (46) We concur in the finding that Sinclair was not deprived of her right to a fair trial and that she has received full and fair evidentiary hearings in the Utah State courts. 
• (47) We affirm. Notes: [1] 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d): In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit — (6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State court proceeding; or (7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court proceeding; And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, when due proof of such factual determination has been made, unless the existence of one or more of the circumstances respectively set forth in paragraphs numbered (1) to (7), inclusive, is shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is admitted by the respondent, or unless the court concludes pursuant to the provisions of paragraph numbered (8) that the record in the State court proceeding, considered as a whole, does not fairly support such factual determination, the burden shall rest upon the applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination by the State court was erroneous.

Robin Tyler 1979

1979 The night before the March on Washington Robin Tyler hosted a concert held at the Sylvan Theatre near the Washington Monument.  Washington, DC's Friends Radio program taped the concert.  Among the artists available on the surviving radio tapes are Maxine Feldman (doing Closet Sale and Angry Athis), the Freedom Sound Jazz Ensemble, the LA Gay Men's Chorus, Casselberry-Dupre (doing Waters of Babylon, Take it to the Limit, Farina, and The Last Pioneers).  The tapes also include remarks by Rev. Troy Perry, Audre Lorde, and Tori Osborne.

1987-In Washington DC 600 people were arrested in an act of civil disobedience at the US Supreme Court to protest the Bowers v. Hardwick decision which upheld the constitutionality of Georgia's sodomy law. It was the largest number to participate in an act of civil disobedience since the Vietnam War. Many of the arresting police officers wore rubber gloves when handling the Gay protesters. Many of

ACT UP Protest at the Supreme Court

the protesters walked quietly, escorted by policemen, to waiting city buses. Others were dragged across the plaza. Although the demonstration was free of any major violent incidents, the police did wrestle to the ground five protesters who had attempted to cross a barricade at the rear of the building. At one point, a group of demonstrators including some AIDS victims sat down on the steps of the building and began to chant, ''We have AIDS, and we have rights.'' At another, as a group crossed the barricades to be arrested, some police officers at the top of the steps placed white gloves on their hands, ostensibly as a protection against AIDS, prompting the crowd to shout, ''Shame, shame!'' and ''Your gloves don't match your shoes!'' The arrests continued until 2 P.M.

1988 A candlelight vigil is held on the Utah State Capitol steps for AIDS Awareness Week organized by the Gay Land Lesbian Community Council of Utah

1989 Friday I saw David Sharpton today at the Utah AIDS Foundation before meeting with Ben Barr. Ben is so sick of David's antic and wants him out of the Utah AIDS Foundation building. I don't know the full details of the rift but knew it was coming. It’s mostly personality conflicts I think. David Sharpton is loud, abrasive, and a Southern Fire Eater but he gets things done. Although he cares little about who’s offended. Ben Barr is more low keyed, very efficient, and more of a prime mover then a hands on worker. He has great PR skills and knows how to smooth the waters, and I'm sure being the brother of Roseanne Barr doesn't hurt either or maybe it does. [Journal of Ben Williams]

Club 14

1990 Health Club That Caters to Gays Under Fire From City  Byline: Russell Weeks Tribune Staff Writer Page: B2 (Copyright 1990) A Salt Lake City health club that, according to its lawyer, caters to homosexuals will lose its license to operate if city officials have their way.  Assistant city attorney Larry V. Spendlove filed final written arguments Thursday in the city's attempt to revoke the business license of Club 14, 1414 W. 200 South.  A private lawyer appointed as a hearing examiner for the Business License Office is expected to decide the case in a week to 10 days, Mr. Spendlove said. City officials contend that a business license issued in January to Leo D. Busch should be revoked because the health club is a public nuisance; its patrons engaged in illegal activities, its managers either condoned or ignored the same activities and the club operated as a rooming house without having a license for that. Club 14's lawyer, Jerome H. Mooney III, contends that the city's arguments are either overdrawn or are unconstitutional.  The city has sought to revoke the club's license since late last spring when four different undercover police officers posed as clients and said they saw alleged illegal activity there. The officers and others testified about the activities at a hearing Aug. 30, but hearing examiner Michael Crippen requested lawyers for both sides to present final arguments in writing. The health club is a converted warehouse with a small sign on the entrance identifying it as Club 14. According to Mr. Mooney's final argument, the business is a private health club that contains exercise equipment, a sauna, a swimming pool, a room for watching television, a social or recreational conversation area and individual, private dressing rooms. "Although no specific restrictions are placed upon membership, the primary focus of the club is toward male, homosexual members," according to Mr. Mooney's written argument.  In a July 27 notice of charges, Mr. Spendlove said undercover police officers joined the club on March 14 and May 31. Two of the officers stayed all night at the club on March 14 but saw no illegal activity.  The two officers who joined the club on May 31 saw men walking around in towels, swimming nude and four alleged sexual acts, one involving two men, the others involving men who were alone.   One of the alleged incidents led to a man being issued a misdemeanor citation during a police raid on Club 14 early June 1, according to the notice of charges. -Copyright 1990-2000, The Salt Lake Tribune

David Pollone

Morton Downey Jr,

1993 Wednesday- ASUU Gay and Lesbian Debate was held between Morton Downey Jr. and Dave Pollone, a former National League umpire who came out of the closet. The two speakers' debate on gay/lesbian civil rights was moderated by Cathy Parrish, lectures coordinator for the Associated Students of the U. The gathering was attended by about 1,000 students and others, with Pallone and Downey sparring on a variety of other topics, ranging from marriage privileges and adoption rights to definitions of a family and professional athletes who are gay or lesbian. One woman wanted to know "what makes a person a homosexual"? Deseret News

1993-Wednesday A Service of Remembrance and Hope was at St. Paul's Episcopal Church and followed by a candle light vigil at the Salt Lake Art Center. (10/03/93  Page: SL Tribune)

Sam Nunn

1993-The Lesbian Avengers protested during a speech by Senator Sam Nunn (D) in New York City. Nunn fought to retain the military's ban on gay and lesbian service persons. The Lesbian Avengers began in New York City in 1992 as a direct action group focused on issues vital to lesbian survival and visibility. They refined media-savvy tactics, often creating actions for their visual appeal, and touched a nerve with the Lesbian Avenger Manifesto. The group quickly spread worldwide after the Avengers organized a Dyke March for lesbian visibility on the eve of the Lesbian and Gay March on Washington in 1993 that mobilized 20,000 lesbians. The Avengers also developed a civil rights organizing project that championed "out" grassroots activism, that not only fought homophobic initiatives, but worked to train activists for the long term.

1996 :  `Stonewall' on Screen: A special screening of the film ``Stonewall,'' to benefit the Utah Stonewall Center, is set for 12:30 p.m. today at the Tower Theatre, 876 E. 900 South in Salt Lake City. The movie follows a young gay man fresh off the bus in New York, buffeted between acceptance-seeking homosexuals and flamboyant drag queens. The movie culminates with the 1969 riots at the Stonewall Inn, often called the pivotal beginning of the gay-rights movement in America. Tickets for the benefit are $7, available at the door.  Page: D12: FILM Byline: Compiled by Sean P. Means

Michael Anthony Archuleta

1996 Sunday, KILLER MOVES CLOSER TO EXECUTION By Jim Rayburn, Staff Writer Condemned killer Michael Anthony Archuleta has lost another round in his legal battle to spare him the death sentence. Fourth District Judge Lynn W. Davis on Friday dismissed Archuleta's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petition was filed more than two years ago. Archuleta made 35 allegations of error in his criminal trial and appeal. Most involved allegations that he had ineffective counsel. However, in a 66-page ruling, Davis said Archuleta did not have ineffective counsel and that many of his claims were brought up earlier during his appeal process. Archuleta was convicted in 1989 of the brutal and torturous slaying of Gordon Ray Church on Nov. 22, 1988. A 4th District jury sentenced him to death. Co-defendant Lance Conway Wood was also convicted but was sentenced to life in prison. Archuleta and Wood were on parole from the Utah State Prison when they abducted Church, a drama student at Southern Utah University, after meeting

him at a Cedar City convenience store. They severely beat Church and sexually assaulted him with a tire iron and battery cables. Wood confessed to police the following day and led them to Church's body. In March 1993 the Utah Supreme Court denied Archuleta's appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear the case later that same year. Archuleta can now appeal Davis' ruling to the Utah Supreme Court. If that appeal is rejected, Archuleta's last legal recourse to stop his execution would be to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Marlin Criddle

1998 Hate-crime protection sought for gays Deseret News By Josh Loftin, staff writer  Published: Tuesday, Oct. 13, 1998  Local leaders of the gay and lesbian movement hope to parlay the beating death of a University of Wyoming student into toughened hate-crime laws and a greater respect for homosexuals. Although Utah does have hate-crime laws, the vague definitions within the law make prosecuting a specific incident extremely difficult, said Marlin Criddle, president of the Utah Lawyer's for Human Rights. Most troubling, Criddle said, was that there was no designation of whom those crimes might be committed against. Criddle was one of a dozen speakers during a press conference at the Salt Lake offices of the American Civil Liberties Union, where a variety of gay advocates, religious leaders, and lawmakers gathered to denounce the beating death of University of Wyoming student Matthew Shepard. They also called for compassion and tolerance among Utahns for gay lifestyles, improved education, and denounced the right-wing rhetoric of groups like The Eagle Forum.  "It's no wonder that hate crimes against gays happen, or will happen again," Criddle said. To help prevent a similar occurrence in Utah, Criddle said that lawmakers need to toughen the hate-crime laws and provide definitions of who those crimes are committed against, such as people of different races, religions, and sexual orientations. In past debates about hate crimes, protecting those of an alternative sexual orientation has proven especially contentious. "This death is another realization that things are not OK," said Ivy Fox, a member of the East High Gay/Straight Alliance. That club is currently embroiled in a lawsuit sparked when the Salt Lake City Board of Education banned all extra-curricular clubs instead of allowing East's GSA to meet. Prejudice is something Fox said she experiences on at least a weekly basis, and sometimes a daily basis, because of her involvement in the club. "This isn't a situation which happens once a year," Fox said. "It happens every day." Speakers noted that hate crimes against gays, although not prevalent, have steadily increased in recent years. "This hateful crime is the direct result when intolerance and hate are continually preached by individuals that believe those violent acts are excusable based on one's sexual orientation," said Monique Predovich, executive director of the Gay and Lesbian Community Center of Utah. "Matthew's death will not be in vain when, and only when, all life is valued equally and perpetrators of crimes motivated by hate are prosecuted to the fullest degree." The proposed Federal Hate Crimes Protection Act would make federal offenses of crimes based on sex, disability and sexual orientation. Current law covers crimes based on race, color, religion or national origin. Of the 41 states that have hate-crime laws, 21 states specifically cover offenses motivated by the victim's sexual orientation.

• 1998-In a New York Times article, Steven Schwalm, a spokesman for the Family Research Council, said that hate crimes laws criminalize pro-family beliefs.
• 
  

1998-In a New York Times article, Steven Schwalm, a spokesman for the Family Research Council, said that hate crimes laws criminalize pro-family beliefs.

1998 2 law professors square off at BYU over same-sex unions By Jeff Call, staff writer

Lynn Wardle

Terry Kogan

Summary A discussion about one of the world's most controversial topics was staged Monday at a most unlikely setting - Brigham Young University. An audience of about 150 turned out to watch BYU law professor Lynn Wardle and University of Utah law professor Terry Kogan engage in a lively debate titled ``Same-sex marriage and the Law,'' sponsored by the BYU Federalists Society. A discussion about one of the world's most controversial topics was staged Monday at a most unlikely setting - Brigham Young University. An audience of about 150 turned out to watch BYU law professor Lynn Wardle and University of Utah law professor Terry Kogan engage in a lively debate titled "Same-sex marriage and the Law," sponsored by the BYU Federalists Society. Wardle acknowledged in his opening statement that the vast majority of BYU students possess a strong moral stance against same-gender unions. But, he added, "At a university, we have the obligation to face these (types of) issues." While BYU is not the place you'd expect to find a debate about same-sex marriages, Hawaii is. It was there that three homosexual couples sued the state for the right to marry in 1991. Legislators in the Aloha State who are opposed to same-sex marriages have placed the issue on the Nov. 3 ballot in an attempt to block a state Supreme Court ruling that would legalize same-gender unions. In 1996, state Circuit Court Judge Kevin Chang ruled the state had to issue marriage licenses to homosexual couples. That judgment is under appeal. For years, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, owner of BYU, has been outspoken in its opposition to gay marriage, believing it is not a civil-rights issue but rather a protection of traditional marriage. The church has donated considerable financial and legal support to fight the issue, not only in Hawaii but also Alaska, where a similar proposition will appear on the Nov. 3 ballot. Recently, the church gave $500,000 to the Alaska Family Coalition to help pay for television, radio and print advertising aimed at urging voters to reject the legalization of gay marriages. In 1995, the Utah Legislature passed a statute declaring same-sex marriage would not be recognized. Since, 29 states have followed suit. Wardle, author of "Contemporary Family Law: Principles, Policy and Practice," said the traditional definition of marriage, that it is a contract between a man and a woman, is "deeply rooted in the history of our people . . . The concept of marriage needs to be clear and unconfused." He added that although there are movements afoot regarding same-sex marriages throughout the world, no country has ever legalized a same-gender marriage. In the United States, he said, "Efforts to do that here have been overwhelmingly repudiated. It is an issue that should be decided by the people." Kogan, a faculty adviser to the Gay and Lesbian Law Alliance at the U., argued that same-sex marriages are opposed merely for "aesthetic" reasons. He compared the opposition to same-sex unions to practice of slavery and Adolf Hitler's genocide of Jews. He called that type of view "frightening." "The issue is not sexual orientation. The issue is sexual discrimination," Kogan said. "A black man can choose a black woman in marriage. A man under modern law cannot choose another man. That looks a lot to me like sexual discrimination." Kogan said some of the ammunition used to fight same-sex marriages is weak. The inability to procreate does not preclude heterosexual couples from becoming legally married, and it shouldn't affect homosexual couples either, he said. Kogan added that same-sex relationships can be as beneficial to society as heterosexual relationships. "Show me the evidence," Wardle countered. "Where is the evidence that (same-gender) relationships are anywhere comparable in their contribution to society as heterosexual relationships?"

1999-President Clinton renewed his call to include gay men and lesbians in hate crimes legislation.

David Ferguson

2001 David Ferguson, Programming Director of Utah AIDS Foundation addressed folks at National Coming Out Day BBQ at Fairmont Park, October 13th, 2001

2003 The Daily Utah Chronicle - News  LGBT dance brings Pride Week to an end By Adam Benson Oliver Schultz never got to attend his senior prom. "I'm a transsexual male who didn't attend high school, so I never got to go. But even if I did, I probably would have gotten the piss beaten out of me," he said. Schultz and about 150 others were on hand in the Union Ballroom Saturday night to celebrate "The Homecoming You Never Had" to culminate Pride

Week at the U. With local Utah band The Saliva Sisters on hand, the party was co-sponsored by the National Affirmation Conference, an organization that serves the needs of gay and lesbian Mormons. The usually divisive atmosphere Pride Week brings to the U was more subdued this year, said Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender Resource Center intern Creig Nielson, one of the week's organizers. "The week went really well...It's going to be hard to top next year," he said.  LGBT Center Director Charles

Charles Milne

Milne agreed, adding that the timing of the National Affirmation Conference allowed Saturday night's dance to really come together. "We wanted something for them to do on a Saturday night, and this gives U students and members of the conference a chance to have a formal dance with the partner they're with," Milne said. Milne and Nielson said the objective of the week's events was to spur dialogue and open the doors of acceptance for members in the LGBT community. "The dialogue that this week has opened up on campus has been incredible," Nielson said. But for Schultz, events like Saturday night's meant more than stoking the flames of discussion. "I certainly think that any dialogue is better than none at all, but really, it's just nice to have somewhere safe to go for something like this," he said.

Laurie Meacham

2003 The Daily Utah Chronicle – Opinion Letter to the Editor: Homosexuals need not fear

Jasmine Linam 

Editor: What an interesting study we have in the small drama of censorship at the Pride Week art show. Jasmine Linam is a co-vice president of the Lesbian and Gay Student Union and a member of the Diversity Board. Based on these positions, one would expect Linam to champion all aspects of being out. Her comments that the photo of two young men kissing was "too in your-face," and her concern that people would "see two men kissing, get offended and walk out without seeing the other art" echoes a tired old refrain-"I don't care what homosexuals do in private as long as they don't flaunt it." The common factor that motivates these kinds of behavior is fear. Linam is afraid that people will be offended by one aspect of the show and that it will undermine the whole show's effect. And homophobia in general is about the fear of difference. That fear is what causes people to hate, violate and discriminate against us. The sweet kiss captured in Heather Franck's photograph would go practically unnoticed if it were between a man and a woman, but if gays dare to be so open, they can get killed. These violations of the right to be open about who we are have given rise to educational events like Pride Week and the Pride Art Show. The key to overcoming fear is openness and learning, where the unknown is seen and therefore demystified. The idea tha

Heather Franck

t the representation of our gay lives needs to be toned down in order to be palatable is as objectionable as the idea that we have to monitor our public behavior in ways that straight people do not. Fear is always a shaky foundation on which to base actions. Perhaps Linam is trying to overcome homophobia by convincing folks that gays are just like other people-that being gay is not just about sex. Maybe that's why, when she sees an image of gay intimacy, she is afraid that people will get offended and not see the other art. Perhaps she thinks that showing art about everything except sexuality will prove that gay artists are "just like everyone else." And maybe this whole story really does serve to illustrate that homosexuals and heterosexuals are more alike than they are different. It may only be a matter of degree, but aren't we all afraid? Laurie Mecham article on exhibit

• Letter to the Editor: Pride Week does not promote equality Editor: Equal rights-it's a beautiful thing. As everyone is quite aware of, last week was Pride Week. Does this seem strange to anyone besides me? The LGBT has Pride Week to promote equal rights for the group it represents. I really don't think that we need a week to celebrate one's sexual identity. There is never a Heterosexual Pride Week or anything of that sort, so why is there a week for those of different preferences? To put it bluntly, Pride Week celebrates one select group of people. That's not equality to me. Parker Williams Freshman, Mass Communication

2004 7:30pm Film Screening Tying the Knot Salt Lake City Library Auditorium 210 East 400 South This screening is held in conjunction with the Utah AIDS Foundation and the Salt Lake City Film Center.

2005 October 13th - RCGSE AIDS WEEK EVENTS Greek to Me (Dinner & movie) at the Paper Moon, 7:00pm, $5.00 cover Also we are hosting a screening of the premiere episode of Transgeneration on October 13th, co-hosted by the GLBTCCU, Equality Utah, and the Utah AIDS Foundation.  It will be screened in the Union Theater at 7 PM, Free admission, and discussion held afterwards for those who wish to stay.  For more info about the series please go to

Michael Aaron

2005  Subject: "From the Editor" column  I don't normally do this, but this is an important column for me, and I want to pass it along.It is from the Salt Lake MetroFrom the Editor  Consequences by Michael Aaron   At three o’clock in the morning last week, I was in my bed next to my partner. We both had our faces in our pillows and our hands over our head. We were being held at gunpoint.  Three men had muscled their way into our house when one of my roommates answered a knock at the door. At least one had on a ski mask and brandished a gun, commanding him and my other roommate to lie face down on the floor. They demanded to know where the nonexistent floor safe was.  I was woken from a deep sleep to loud voices and stomping on the floor above me. After a few minutes of this, I was pissed. Obviously, my roommate that enjoys bringing people home at all hours of the day and night had done just that again. And this time, they were making no pretense to be quiet.  I got out of bed, put something on and made my way upstairs. At the top of the stairs was a guy I didn’t know. I stared him in the eyes, annoyed, and intended to go past him. I was struck by how dark and deep and empty his eyes were. “Back up!” he yelled. I stopped and realized that 1) he wasn’t talking to me—he was calling for backup, and 2) he had a gun in his hand and it was pointed at me. I began to become conscious of the fact that I was being robbed at gunpoint. That I would later be asked—if I survived—what he looked like, how tall he was, what kind of gun he had in his hand.  I had already begun to forget all of those things. All I could think of was that someone was in my house—my castle, my safe space—and I was no longer the one in control. The training I went through when I started the Anti-Violence Project started going through my head. It now boiled down to what is the most important goal: staying alive. I stepped back down one stair and slowly turned around. He asked if there was  anyone else. I thought of my partner lying asleep in the bed, but said, “No.” He followed me down the stairs and flipped on the lights. I hoped that my partner was still asleep and the gunman might miss seeing him on the bed. However, he was sitting up, having been awoken by the noise as well. The gunman told us both to lie with our faces in the pillow and hands over our heads. We did. He asked where the money was, where the jewels were. I told him I had neither. Another of the three came down and they rifled through everything in the room. At one point they said they had only a little over a minute left. There was no noise for a while. Eventually my dogs barked and I wasn’t sure if that indicated them leaving, more people coming, or if they were just barking at some unrelated dog or person in the street.  We waited. I turned my head slowly, figuring I’d get yelled at if they were still there. No one said anything. I chanced turning the rest of the way to see if they were still there, pointing their guns at us. They weren’t.  I reached for my cell phone and dialed 911. I whispered my address once I heard an answer. They said nothing. I said it again. They asked what was wrong. I said two words: “Robbery. Guns,” and hung up. I stuffed the phone between the mattresses in case they came back down. A minute later the phone started to ring. “Fuck!” I yanked the phone back out of the mattresses and hurriedly turned it off. We waited. The dogs barked again. I hear footsteps upstairs. The first roommate calls down that the police were here. The whole incident lasted probably only about ten minutes. I went upstairs. It was cold. That must be why I was shaking so hard. I turned up the heat.   When the officer went down to look in our room, he asked if I did drugs.   “No,” I said.   He asked if anyone else in the house did. “One of my roommates used too, but I don’t think he does any more.” It was a lie. I had allowed this roommate to live in the house because he had fallen on bad times. At the time, he promised his drug use was a thing of the past.  Within weeks of him moving in I began to find paraphernalia. Simple, easy to dismiss kind of stuff: razor blades, cut up straws, small baggies, large cans of butane. I would also find him awake at strange hours on his hands and knees in a maniacal frenzy, scrubbing the bathroom floor or doing some other household chore. This would be followed by a few days that he looked like death warmed over. He continued to maintain he wasn’t on drugs.  “This kind of thing is almost always about drugs,” the officer continued. “They knew or thought that ___ had drugs here.”  I then realized that I knew that from the moment I looked into the gunman’s soulless eyes. The months of knowing that I was being lied to but telling myself it was his life—I wasn’t his mother—now boiled down to this. It isn’t just his life. It’s mine and my partner’s and my other roommate’s, too. It’s my friends that were over earlier that evening and could very well have crashed on my couch. We are all living with the consequences of someone else’s bad choices in life. I have run several anti-meth ads in this newspaper. I had a number of people tell me that they were all wrong, that people could use meth responsibly. That what I should be advertising was the proper way to do it and resources they could go to if it got out of hand. Nearly all of these people who were saying this were meth users themselves.  The fact is, the ads I put in this paper are not targeted towards the meth user. They are targeted to those who don’t use, but may be thinking about it. Their goal is to deglorify meth and show it for what it is: a death sentence to life as you now know it.  But it turns out to be more than that. It turns out it is a death sentence to life as I knew it too.  Sleeping in the very bed we were held in is now a different story—one that takes pills. I now awaken every time the dogs bark, every time I hear movement upstairs. I close my eyes and I am haunted by either a vision of my partner, face down in a pillow with his hands over his head or those eyes with no soul. I’ve woken up in the middle of the night after having a dream in which I am raping the guy who pointed the gun at me. The next morning I began packing my roommate’s clothes. I dismantled his bed. I found so much drug paraphernalia that it made me sick. I told him that he could no longer live in the house. “I can’t live like this,” I told him. “I can’t live with the consequences of your bad choices in life.” I keep reading the local newspapers to see if there is any mention of what we went through. Nothing. Apparently it has become such an overplayed song that it doesn’t warrant even a paragraph in the “For the Record” column. And apparently it means very little to the Salt Lake City Police Department. The case was assigned to a detective who is out of town for two weeks. 

2005 1High School Clubs: Provo School District has chance to show new tolerance Provo High School in 2005 is a long way from Salt Lake City's East High School a decade ago. At least, we hope it is. Back then, when a group of gay and lesbian students at East High wanted to form a school club, it caused an uproar that spread beyond the Salt Lake City School District to the state attorney general's office and the Legislature. Now some Provo High students want to form a school-sanctioned gay- straight alliance. In response, the Provo District, to its credit, is proposing a clubs policy setting the same rules for academic and non- academic clubs that would not discriminate against a club with the word "gay" in its name. That was not the case in '95, when derogatory epithets were cast back and forth between those who supported the students' right to meet together at the school and those who were horrified that the club would promote homosexuality and talk about sex, a topic that Utah law and culture put out of bounds in public schools. Over time, just about everybody weighed in. East High banned all clubs, from the ski club to the chess club to the Gay and Lesbian Alliance. But the federal Equal Access Act - the 1980s brainchild of conservatives who wanted students to be able to form religion clubs - allowed groups of all kinds to rent school space, and the East High club regrouped as the Gay-Straight Alliance and continued to meet. Then, four years later, after taking hits from parents on all sides and fending off lawsuits, the district voted to bring the clubs back. In 1996 a new state law was passed that allows districts to deny access to clubs that "materially or substantially encourage criminal or delinquent conduct, promote bigotry or involve human sexuality," and the State School Board approved a policy that lets local school districts set regulations for clubs, including requiring parental permission for a student to join. We hope the Provo District learned lessons from the Salt Lake District brouhaha 10 years ago, not just about how to legally accommodate student clubs, but about the needs and rights of homosexual students for whom bigotry and isolation are a daily part of their high school experience. Some things have changed in 10 years, but those needs are the same. We agree with the father of a gay Provo student that a gay-straight alliance club could promote tolerance and respect and we urge the Provo District to adopt a policy that welcomes it.

2006 FETISH BALL Presented by: Princess Royale XXXI Vanessa Vaughn Prespentte From Hell Friday October 13, 2006 8:30 P.M. *The Trapp Door $5.00 To Benefit The PWA Christmas Fund Come as naughty as you want!!!! Vinyl, leather, rubber, chains, whips...you get the idea! :o)

2006 PARENTS! Please pass this information on to your kids!! Have you ever wondered if you were the only one that has a lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender parent? Well, you are not alone! COLAGE (Children of Lesbians and Gays Everywhere) is a nationally recognized organization that supports and empowers youth that have LGBT parents. If you are 11-17 years old and have an LGBT parent, we would love for you to join us for a COLAGE pizza and soda social. This event will take place October 13th 2006 at 7:00 pm and will be held in the middle meeting room of the LGBT Community Center. Gay Bingo is also that night – so your parents can attend Bingo, while you attend the social! This will be a great opportunity to meet others who also face the everyday challenges and benefits of having a LGBT parent. We will have a chance to get to know each other and to get to know a little bit about our families. We’ll also discuss the future of COLAGE and the possibility of upcoming activities.  The best part of all: you will be in a safe and supportive environment where you don’t have to worry about being judged for loving your LGBT parent. We hope to see you there! For any questions feel free to call or email Cara Cerise .

John Waters

2006 John Waters in person CINEMATIC IMMUNITY - AN EVENING WITH JOHN WATERS Tower Theatre $20 A full hour and a half rant about independent film! Price includes film screening of either PINK FLAMINGOS or HAIRSPRAY